Why do some forms of repression make violent resistance appear morally acceptable while others do not? Classic theories hold that coercion either deters dissent or radicalizes it, but rarely specify the thresholds at which different repertoires of resistance acquire moral legitimacy or whether those thresholds differ across repertoires. We develop a moral economy theory of resistance, suggesting repression breaches the moral contract between state and society in ways that license violence earlier than they legitimize non-violent protest.

We test the argument with a preregistered vignette experiment (N = 2,176) in Morocco and Tunisia, randomizing the severity of repression against a targeted minority group and measuring the moral acceptability of violent and non-violent resistance as parallel outcomes. Even mild, legalistic repression, such as surveillance, bureaucratic obstruction, and hostile rhetoric, increases the moral acceptability of violent resistance, while non-violent resistance gains legitimacy only under extreme repression. Respondents ground the permissibility of violence in the state's repression itself, while grounding non-violence in cultural expression regardless of severity. Repression thus reprices resistance repertoires asymmetrically, challenging both linear radicalization accounts and proportionality models of legitimate counter-violence.

Over the past two decades, anti-terrorism laws have proliferated around the world, reshaping how states confront armed groups. But their consequences remain poorly understood. This project develops and tests a theory of legal backlash, suggesting that anti-terrorism laws can escalate rather than suppress violence when states lack the legitimacy to enforce law impartially. In weakly institutionalized settings, these laws expand coercive power without resolving underlying grievances, provoking resistance over compliance.

We evaluate this argument using a nested mixed-method design across four studies. Study 1 introduces original data on anti-terrorism legislation across 17 West African and Lake Chad Basin states (2000–2024) and estimates the causal effect of law adoption on violence. Study 2 uses a re-treatment design to assess whether legal amendments trigger further escalation. Study 3 turns to subnational variation in Nigeria, combining local measures of coercive capacity with interviews with security actors, former combatants, and civilians to identify the mechanisms at work. Study 4 fields a survey experiment in Nigeria to test whether legal framing shapes public beliefs about the legitimacy and expected consequences of enforcement.

Across all four studies, we find that anti-terrorism laws systematically generate violent backlash under conditions of weak legitimacy. Laws are not neutral instruments of order but political interventions that can, in fragile settings, generate the very violence they seek to prevent. The findings carry direct implications for counter-terrorism policy, legal reform, and international assistance programs across the Sahel.

Armed conflict and forced displacement threaten access to essential healthcare, yet we know relatively little about how insecurity disrupts the continuity of treatment for chronic conditions or which institutional arrangements can mitigate these disruptions. This project examines how political violence and displacement affect HIV treatment continuity in Uganda through four interconnected studies.

Study 1 combines nationwide facility-level HIV treatment records with geocoded conflict data to estimate the effects of armed violence on treatment delivery and outcomes, including viral suppression. Study 2 uses original surveys, treatment histories, qualitative interviews, and a proposed survey experiment among refugees in Kyangwali to identify the mechanisms through which displacement interrupts care, distinguishing between supply-side constraints and barriers to patient access. Study 3 proposes a randomized field intervention evaluating whether flexible healthcare arrangements, such as decentralized medication distribution, portable medical records, and extended prescription refills, improve treatment retention among displaced populations. Study 4 examines whether health facilities with more adaptable service-delivery models demonstrate greater resilience to conflict-related shocks, using longitudinal administrative data and comparative institutional analysis.

Together, these studies investigate how violence undermines healthcare provision, why displaced populations experience treatment interruptions, and whether institutional flexibility can sustain essential services during crises. The project contributes to research on political violence, forced displacement, public service delivery, and health-system resilience, while generating evidence to inform healthcare interventions in conflict-affected settings.

Armed violence disrupts economic activity by restricting civilian mobility, yet we know relatively little about how individuals navigate insecurity or which forms of protection enable them to sustain their livelihoods. This project examines how exposure to violence shapes market participation and civilian mobility in Nigeria through three complementary studies.

Study 1 combines satellite-derived measures of market attendance with geocoded conflict-event data to estimate how exposure to armed violence affects market participation across northwestern Nigeria. Using a longitudinal event-study design, the analysis examines the magnitude, timing, and persistence of economic disruptions following violent incidents. Study 2 draws on a nationwide survey experiment in Nigeria to investigate how individuals adjust their travel decisions in response to insecurity and alternative protection arrangements. By experimentally varying information about violence, security provision, travel costs, and companionship, the study identifies the conditions under which civilians are willing to undertake economically necessary journeys. Study 3 uses qualitative interviews in rural communities in Kaduna and Zamfara to investigate how civilians assess the credibility of different security providers, navigate threats, and adapt their economic activities under persistent insecurity.

Together, these studies examine how violence constrains economic participation, why some protection arrangements are more credible than others, and how civilians balance security concerns against livelihood needs. The project contributes to research on political violence, civilian protection, and economic development by demonstrating how the credibility of security provision shapes economic resilience in conflict-affected settings.

South Sudan hosts one of the world's most acute displacement crises, with millions of Arab refugees settling alongside host communities in areas of scarce resources. Tensions between displaced and host populations are common, fuelled by competition over aid and livelihoods. This study asks whether deliberately structuring livelihood programs to bring these groups together and to collaborate toward shared economic goals can improve both program effectiveness and intergroup relations.

Using a factorial 2×2 randomized design, we assign approximately 800 participants across 400 pairs to conditions that vary group composition (heterogeneous refugee–host pairs vs. homogeneous refugee-only or host-only pairs) and task structure (collaborative joint business proposals vs. individual proposals). All participants receive the same entrepreneurial skills and business development training; what varies is who they work with and whether they are asked to develop a proposal together. Pairs submitting the strongest proposals receive seed funding to launch their business, providing real-stakes incentives for engagement. This design allows us to estimate the independent and interactive effects of contact and collaboration on social cohesion, intergroup attitudes, willingness to cooperate, and proposal quality.

The study is implemented in Unity, Northern Bahr El-Ghazal, and Warrap states in partnership with Youth Action Against Poverty (YAAP). It is funded by Innovations for Poverty Action in collaboration with the IKEA Foundation.

Between 2013 and 2019, over 53,000 individuals from more than 85 countries travelled to join ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Fewer than 6,000 have returned home. Tens of thousands remain detained across the Middle East and North Africa. Governments now face the fundamental question of whether citizens who joined ISIS should be repatriated, prosecuted, or indefinitely confined abroad. But it is unclear under what conditions repatriation and reconciliation can succeed. Long-term viability depends not just on legal frameworks or security assessments, but on public acceptance. Despite years of political and media attention, we lack systematic evidence on how communities most directly affected by ISIS recruitment evaluate former members and draw moral boundaries between forgiveness, punishment, and exclusion.

This project addresses this limitation through a comparative, multi-method study across six countries in the MENA: Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. Using a two-wave panel survey, we deploy two experiments. The first is a forced-choice conjoint that isolates how returnee attributes shape public support for repatriation, reconciliation, and punishment. The second is a perspective-taking intervention that asks respondents to imagine themselves as a former ISIS member seeking to return home, testing whether induced empathy can reduce perceived threat and soften punitive attitudes. Fieldwork in Morocco and Tunisia complements the survey evidence with elite interviews, focus groups, and trauma-informed interviews with former members of ISIS.